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I. INTRODUCTION
The word "law" resonates richly in the language and mythology of
western civilization. H.L.A. Hart began his great work, The Concept of
Law, with an inquiry into the persistence of the question "what is law?"
in our jurisprudence.1 He argued that it is strange that such an appar-
ently elementary question has persisted in jurisprudence while no
analogous question such as "What is chemistry?" has occupied other areas
of human inquiry.2 Hart's answer to his own question is, in some sense,
the book, itself. He stresses and illuminates the analytic perplexities that
constitute the deep structure of our concept of law. But there is an
historical and political answer to Hart's question which may be more
to the point. The literature on the question "what is law?" is voluminous
and continues to grow not because there are analytic difficulties in our
conceptual apparatus-our categories-in this field. There are, indeed,
such difficulties, but they are no greater than analogous problems in the
categories of the sciences. In the sciences, however, the illumination of
a deep structural ambiguity hitherto uncaptured by the "chemistry"
paradigm does not lead to another round in a perpetual argument over
"what is chemistry" but to the creation of new fields like "biochemistry"
or "molecular biology." The new fields take as their standard cases the
problematic case for "chemistry." The label itself is not the object of
controversy.
A label may be the object of controversy, however, if the question
is not "what is chemistry?", but rather, "what is science?"' For the word
"science" is a heavily loaded one, freighted with normative significance.
If one is doing "science"-which may or may not be chemistry-then
the legitimacy of the enterprise is not in question, only the appropriate
administrative label. Such labels are matters of convenience. But if one
is not doing science at all, then the charge is that the enterprise itself
* This paper was the basis for the 1984 John E. Sullivan Lecture given on
November 15, 1984 at Capital University Law School.
** Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale Law School.
1. H.L.S. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1 (1961).
2. Id.
3. The philosophy of science in recent decades is frequently a debate about what
is science. Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) has been enor-
mously influential in defeating simplistic earlier models of "scientific method" as systems
of observiation, hypothesis, confirmation/disconfirmation. Michael Polanyi's brilliant work
Personal Knowledge (1958) represents a still earlier and in some ways richer critique
of what was then conventional philosophy of science.
HeinOnline -- 14 Cap. U. L. Rev. 179 1984-1985
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
is outside the scope of legitimate inquiry for a certain sort of truth.'
The word "law", itself, is always a primary object of contention.
People argue and fight over "what is law" because the very term is
a valuable resource in the enterprises that lead people to think and talk
about law in the first place. "Law" evokes the law given on Sinai, Solon's
legislative enterprise, Kant's categorical imperative. On a political level,
it connotes legitimacy in the exercise of coercion and in the organiza-
tion of authority and privilege.5 On a philosophical plane it connotes
universality and objectivity. Legal positivism may be seen, in one sense,
as a massive effort that has gone on in a self-conscious way for over
two centuries to strip the word "law" of these resonances.' But the sacred
narratives of our world doom the positivist enterprise to failure, or, at
best, to only imperfect success.7
Historicist and analytic debunking of "law" have, indeed, rendered
the term problematic. There is now a counter-resonance. For law has
4. Thus, the battle over the label science is fought out not only on the front
of philosophy: what is science? what is scientific method? but also through various heavily
loaded questions for particular fields: e.g., is Psychoanalysis a science? is its method scien-
tific? See, e.g., N.Y. Times, January 15, 1985, at C1. See also M. EDELSON, HYPOTHESIS
AND EVIDENCE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS (1984).
Similarly, great heat and everlasting smoke may be generated over the question of whether
"social science" is "science". More narrowly, still, consider the debates over the "scien-
tific" character of IQ testing. And, also, the long debate over the issue of whether ESP
studies can be called "scientific."
5. It is a resource in legitimation, in aspirations to ideas of justice and in ambi-
tion for social control. See, e.g., E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 258-269, especially
260-64 (1975). "Most men have a strong sense of justice, at least with regard to their
own interest. If law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize
nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegemony. The essential precondition for the
effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence
from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to be so without
upholding its own logic and criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually being just."
Id. at 263 (emphasis in original).
6. See J. BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1776) And see, especially, H.L.A.
Hart's classic defense of positivism in the Hart-Fuller debate in the Harvard Law Review:
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
7. The fact that "law" is located in our myths and stories as a powerful attribute
of legitimate authority creates a potential ironic twist in the political consequences of
positivist theory. The positivist assures us that evil "law" is "law" nonetheless, that the
character of something as "law" cannot depend upon its moral qualities. Yet, the
mythologies that we share do give that which is law legitimating force not by virtue
of a sound analytic argument but by virtue of brute facts of culture, language and history.
The result of the two vectors of positivism and cultural legitimation may be the unwanted
greater legimation of evil law. Positivism breaks down psychological barriers to outright
conscription of the word "law" to nefarious purposes which natural law thinking might create.
There remains, however, especially among the masses- sufficient cultural force to the
symbolism of law that the evil law is given a substantial degree of legitimacy it would
not otherwise have. Whether such a situation is "stable" is doubtful.
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also come to suggest the mask of privilege.' Nonetheless, the very mean-
ing of law as an effective mask or ideology would be lost were the word
to lose its primary mythic resonances9 . The struggle over what is "law"
is then a struggle over which social patterns can plausibly be coated
with a veneer which changes the very nature of that which it covers
up. There is not automatic legitimation of an institution by calling it
or what it produces "law", but the label is a move, the staking out of
a position in the complex social game of legitimation. The jurispruden-
tial inquiry into the question "what is law" is an engagement at one
remove in the struggle over what is legitimate.'0
I have recently staked out a position about the nature of law that
has obvious and consciously chosen political significance." My position
is very close to a classical anarchist one-with anarchy understood to
mean the absence of rulers, not the absence of law. Law, I argued, is
a bridge in normative space connecting [our understanding of] the "world-
that-is" (including the norms that 'govern' and the gap between those
norms and the present behavior of all actors) with our projections of
alternative "worlds-that-might-be" (including alternative norms that might
'govern' and alternative juxtapositions of imagined actions with those
imagined systems of norms. 2 In this theory, law is neither to be wholly
identified with the understanding of the present state of affairs nor with
the imagined alternatives. It is the bridge-the committed social behavior
which constitutes the way a group of people will attempt to get from
here to there. Law connects "reality" to alternity"3 constituting a new
reality with a bridge built out of committed social behavior. Thus, vi-
sions of the future are more or less strongly determinative of the bridge
which is "law" depending upon the commitment and social organization
of the people who hold them.
The above is not a definition of law; it is a plea to understand the
legitimating force of the term in a certain way. It is a plea to grant
all collective behavior entailing systematic understandings of our com-
mitments to future worlds equal claim to the word "law". The upshot
of such a claim, of course, is to deny to the nation state any special
status for the collective behavior of its officials or for their systematic
understandings of some special set of "governing" norms."' The status
8. See Horwitz, Review of Whigs and Hunter, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977).
9. See E. THOMPSON, supra note 5.
10. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).
The critical legal studies movement has certainly been a primary force in placing the
ideological functions and the "legitimation" process at the heart of contemporary legal
scholarship.
11. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
12. Id. at 9-10.
13. G. STEINER, AFTER BABEL 222 (1975).
14. Cover, supra note 11, at 25-41.
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of such "official" behavior and "official" norms is not denied the dignity
of "law." But it must share the dignity with thousands of other social
understandings. In each case the question of what is law and for whom
is a question of fact about what certain communities believe and with
what commitments to those beliefs. The organized behavior of other
groups and the commitments of actors within them have as sound a claim
to the word "law" as does the behavior of state officials. The most im-
portant consequence of this radical relativization of law is that violence-
a special problem in the analysis of any community's commitments to
its future-must be viewed as problematic in much the same way
whether it is being carried out by order of a federal district judge, a
mafioso or a corporate vice-president."
I have argued not only that the nature of law is a bridge to the
future, but also that each community builds its bridges iwth the materials
of sacred narrative that take as their subject much more than what is
commonly conceived as the "legal." The only way to segregate the legally
relevant narrative from the general domain of sacred texts would be
to trivialize the "legal" into a specialized subset of business or
bureaucratic transactions."
The commitments that are the material of our bridges to the future
are learned and expressed through sacred stories. Paradigmatic gestures
are rehearsed in them. Thus, the claim to a "law" is a claim as well
to an understanding of a literature and a tradition. It doesn't matter
how large the literature or how old the tradition. Sinai might have been
yesterday or four thousand years ago; the text might be two tablets
or the infinity of Borges' library of Babel."
In my earlier work on this subject, I considered primarily the com-
mitments and narratives of those communities who would make a law
for themselves apart from that of the State. I believed and still believe
that that emphasis is a necessary corrective to the imbalanced character
of almost all contemporary legal theory. Nonetheless, I did consider
briefly the commitments that are implicit in the assumption of jurisdic-
tion by official judges of the state.18 In that section of my earlier work
I criticized most jurisdictional reasoning as largely apologetic, state-
15. Please note well, here, that I am not saying that all violence is equally justified
or unjustified. I am claiming that it is problematic in the same say. By that I mean that
the form of analysis that we enter into to determine whether or not the violence is justified
is the same. That same method will, of course, if it is any good at all, not yield the same
answer with respect to dissimilar cases.
16. Cover, supra note 11, at 19-25. See also the important work of James White
arguing for the significance of such narrative materials in the "culture of argument."
J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984); White, Law as Language: Reading Law
and Reading Literatuare, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415 (1982).
17. Borges, The Library of Babel, in LABYRINTH 51 (D. Yates & J. Irby eds. 1964).
18. Cover, supra note 11, at 53-60.
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serving enterprises. I did conclude, however, with the following,
undeveloped thought:
It is possible to conceive of a natural law of jurisdiction.
In elaborating such a law ...a judge might appeal to nar-
ratives of judicial resistance .... He might thus defend his own
authority to sit in judgment over those who exercise extralegal
violence in the name of the state. In a truly violent, authoritarian
situation, nothing is more revolutionary than the insistence of
a judge that he exercises such a "jurisdiction" - but only if that
jurisdiction implies the articulation of legal principle according
to an independent hermeneutic ...
Such a hermeneutic of jurisdiction [texts], however, is risky.
It entails commitment to a struggle, the outcome of which-
moral and physical-is always uncertain."
In this article, I take up the task of elaborating on the idea that there
are sacred narratives of jurisdiction that might constitute the texts to
ground judicial commitments. In part II, I shall consider one category
of such texts-the resistance to "Kings". In Part III, I shall consider
another, more problematic category -bringing the Messiah. Part II treats
of the minimal aspirations of our myths for autonomous "law." Part III
treats of the place of law in more comprehensive Utopian reorderings
of the world.
II. OF JUDGES AND KINGS
Leonard Koppett once wrote that the most important single fact
about hitting a baseball and the one least mentioned explicitly is fear.20
There is in the archetype of an upright judge-as there is in the upright
batter-an important element of having conquered a fear, a fear which
is always present yet almost forgotten. To understand that fear and its
significance we must tell the stories that remember the fear and
rehearse the gestures we make in response to it.
There is in the Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin, a fascinating account.
The law in the Talmud (Mishneh) seems clear: "The king does not judge
and we do not judge him." 2' This rule appears to state a not unexpected
norm of sovereign immunity and a perhaps unexpected norm of sovereign
judicial incapacity. The rule was enunciated almost two thousand years
ago and it will, as we shall explore, perhaps ring some bells concerning
English law in the seventeenth century.' In any event, the Talmud, hav-
19. Id. at 58-60.
20. L. KOPPETT, A THINKING MAN'S GUIDE TO BASEBALL (1967).
21. MISHNEH SANHEDRIN, II, 3.
22. See notes 29-37 infra and accompanying text.
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ing stated the rule in question, asks about its origin. Let me quote the
answer in full:
But why this prohibition? Because of an incident which happened
with a slave (servant) of King Yannai, who killed a man. Simeon
b. Shetah (head of Sanhedrin) said to the court of sages: Be bold
and let us judge him. They sent for the king saying, your slave
killed a man. The King sent the slave to them. They sent to
the King saying you must appear with him. He appeared but
sat down before the court. Then Simeon b. Shetah said, Stand
on your feet, King Yannai, so witnesses may testify against thee.
For you do not stand before us but before He who spoke and
the World was created. The King replied, 'I will not act by your
word but upon the words of the court as a whole. He then turn-
ed to the left and to the right, but all looked at the ground.
Then Simeon said, Are you wrapped in thought? Let the Master
of thoughts come and call you to account. Instantly, Gabriel came
and smote them all and they died. Then it was enacted: The King
may neither judge nor be judged, testify nor be testified against.'
What, we might ask, are we to make of this fabulous tale of a not
altogether unreasonable king, a courageous, perhaps foolhardly and
somewhat inflexible judge, and the Angel Gabriel? It seems clear enough
that the taleteller and the redactor of the text consider it both a cau-
tionary tale and a celebration of courage. Simeon b. Shetah is the hero.
He is spared, and his castigation of his cravenly colleagues leads dir-
ectly to their demise at the hand of the angel. At the same time the
incident is put forward to account for a rule of law which, itself, seems
to owe more to the cowardice of Simeon's colleagues than to the courage
of their leader. The rule which results from the incident is not, after
all, that Courts judge Kings courageously and impartially, but that they
do not judge them at all. Before we begin an analysis of this very com-
mon paradox of jurisdiction, we should explore, for a bit, the historic
episode that may lie behind this fabulous story.
The tales of the Talmud may be founded in myth or history. They
may owe their fabulous character to literary or religious imagination,
to failure to appreciate and preserve scientific historicity, or to the
need-in some periods-to disguise a story with revolutionary implica-
tions. In the case of the story of King Yannai and Simeon b. Shetah
we have another ancient source which tells a similar though by no means
identical tale. In his work, Jewish Antiquities, the hellenized Jewish
historian, Josephus, related a story which, if true, took place in 47 B.C.E.
almost forty years after the death of King Yannai.
23. BABYLONIAN TALMUD [hereinafter cited as B.], Sanhedrin, 19a-19b.
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Antipater the Idumite had been appointed the governor or procurator
of Judea by Caesar. He executed his office while Hyrcanus II, the
hereditary, legitimate, ruler of the Jews, descendant of the Hasmonean
family of high priests, served as high priest and titular King of the
Jewish nation. Both Hyrcanus and Antipater strongly supported Caesar
and the Romans in their Egyptian campaign. In return, Caesar supported
Hyrcanus in his conflict with Aristobulus II over Hasmonean succession.
Antipater, at least for a while, formed an alliance with Hyrcanus. An-
tipater's second son, Herod, still very young, was made governor of the
Galilee. There, he succeeded in boldly putting down a group of bandits
or rebels, killing the leader and a number of others. According to
Josephus, this and other acts formed the basis of a series of complaints
from leading Jews that Antipater and his sons had become the de facto
rulers of Judea and that Hyrcanus and the Jews were left with but a
shadow.2'
The complainants fastened upon the fact that Herod's execution of
the leader and some men of the band of brigands without judicial trial
violated Israel's law. They asked that Herod be brought to account for
this act. Hyrcanus, whether for political or personal reasons, summoned
Herod to be tried for the act. [The servant of the king had killed a man].
Josephus suggests that Hyrcanus may have then received some sort of
instructions or requests from Sextus, Roman governor of Syria, that
Herod be acquitted. ' In any event, Josephus tells us that Herod arrived
with a bodyguard of troops and stood before the Sanhedrin or Court
with those troops, an act which had the desired effect:
he overawed them all, and no one of those who had denounced
him before his arrival dared to accuse him thereafter; instead
there was silence and doubt about what was to be done.2
Josephus then goes on with a remarkable parallel to the Talmud's tale.
While they were in this state, someone named Samaias, an
24. JOSEPHUS, JEWISH ANTIQUITIES, Book XIV 143-184 (Loeb Classical Library,
Josephus. VII, R. Marcus, trans. 1976) For the date of the event in question see Loeb
Edition, at 533 note d.
25. Id. at 170. See also Loeb Edition, at 539 note e. There is a somewhat more
abbreviated version of this event related in Josephus, I The Jewish War, 211 (reprinted
by Penguin, G. Williamson, at 48-49). In The Jewish War, Josephus attributes Hycranus'
motive in bringing Herod to trial entirely to jealousy. He sees the event as one involving
a play by Hyrcanus to regain real power which was blocked by Sextus acting as ally
and patron of Herod.
26. JOSEPHUS, supra note 22, at 171. See also JOSEPHUS, supra note 23, at 201 note ff. In
The Jewish War the trial scene is not related but Josephus does say that Herod "presented
himself in Jerusalem, accompanied by a strong escort -not so swollen a force as to sug-
gest the intention of dethroning Hyrcanus, nor small enough to leave him helpless in
face of jealousy." I&. at 211.
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upright man and for that reason superior to fear, arose and said,
'Fellow councillors and King, I do not myself know of, nor do
I suppose that you can name, anyone who when summoned before
you for trial has ever presented such an appearance. . . But
this fine fellow Herod, who is accused of murder ... stands here
clothed in purple, with the hair of his head carefully arranged
and with his soldiers around him, in order to kill us if we con-
demn him as the law prescribes, and to save himself by outrag-
ing justice. But it is not Herod whom I should blame for this
... but you and the King for giving him such great licence. Be
assured, however, that God is great, and this man, whom you
now wish to release for Hyrcanus' sake, will one day punish you
and the King as well.' And he was not mistaken in either part
of his prediction. For when Herod assumed royal power, he killed
Hyrcanus and all the other members of the Sanhedrin with the
exception of Samaias. 7
Hyrcanus, by Josephus' account, saw that Samaias had moved the
Court and postponed any decision so that Herod could escape. At that
point, Herod resolved not to answer any future summons. 8
While there are difficulties and possible internal contradictions in
Josephus' account, it plainly described an historical moment of great
danger in the jurisdiction of the Sanhedrin-a moment the moral enor-
mity of which is captured in the Talmud's tale. That the historical
referent for both tales was the same event has long been recognized
even by traditional Medieval Jewish commentators on the Talmud for
whom Josephus was hardly a canonical text.'
27. JOSEPHUS, supra note 22, at 172-76. The identity of Samaias is a matter of scholarly
dispute. See Loeb Edition at 540-41 note a, for difficulties in piecing together the parallel
accounts.
28. JOSEPHUS, supra note 22, at 177-79.
29. See HIDUSHEI HALAHOTH VE. AGGADOT MAHARSHA (Novellae of Laws and Legends
of Samuel Eliezer ben Judah Ha-Levi Edels, 1555-1631) discussing B. SANHEDRIN 19a:
"[Tihe reason he (the King) did not send him (the servant) to them and emancipate
him (thus removing his own legal responsibility to answer) may have been that the ser-
vant was dear to him and it was hard for him to put him to death. And when he first
sent him before them he relied on the supposition that they would not judge him from
fear of the King since he was the servant of the King as they say. And so it appears
from Josephus that this murdering servant was Herod and the King wanted to save him."
(My translation).
See L. FINKELSTEIN, II THE PHARISEES, 684 n.6 (1938) for a discussion of some nine-
teenth and twentieth century critical scholarship on the event in question. The discus-
sion of the MAHARSHA on this question, which I have translated above, shows that the iden-
tification of the two stories long antedates the Wissenschaft des Judentums sources cited
by Finkelstein.
The persistent question concerning the identity of "Samaias" in the account of
Josephus is of interest. Shammai the Elder-who is one of the candidates for the role-is
[Vol. 14:179
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Before we begin an analysis of this story, it is well to compare it
to a striking counterpart in seventeenth century English legal history.
The special, sacred history of the common law treats as one of its high
moments the opinion supposedly enunciated by Chief Justice Coke in
the matter reported by him and published posthumously under the style,
Prohibitions Del Roy.' King James, you will remember, had become angry
at the writs of prohibition emanating from the common law courts and
directed at the Court of High Commission., Some of these prohibitions
had issued with respect to the power of High Commission to punish
puritans for breaches of ecclesiastical discipline. The culmination of a
string of acrimonious disputes over the use of the writ of prohibition
by the common law courts to restrain High Commission came in Fuller's
Case.31 Nicholas Fuller was a barrister who had defended puritan
dissenters in trouble over breaches of discipline. In one case before High
Commission, Fuller had overreached a bit in his rhetoric, complaining
said, by the Talmud, to have differed with the majority of the Sages in that he held
that one who procures the murder of a third person at the hand of an agent is nonetheless
completely responsible as a murderer. See B. KIDDUSHIN, 43a. While there is absolutely
no basis in either the Talmud's account or the account of Josephus for believing that
the trial of Herod ever got to the point of a discussion of legal principles grounding Herod's
liability as commander for acts done at and under his command, it is nonetheless interesting
that Shammai did advocate from a minority position the only rule of law which would
have rendered Herod criminally liable. Moreover, Shammai's proof text is II Samuel c.12,
v. 9: ".... you killed him with the sword of the Ammonites." referring to David's sending
Uriah to the front against the Ammonites.
The identification of Herod and Yannai occurs elsewhere in Rabbinic literature. I'm
not sure what to make of it, but in Megillath Ta'anith, ch. 11., we find:
"On the second of Shevat is a holiday and not for lamentations. And why is this
different from, "that [the first day] for as to the first day, it is not written
that there not be lamentations," and here it is written. On the first day (of
Shevath) Herod died and on this (second) day Yannai the King died. And it is
a joy before the Holy One Blessed Be He when the wicked are removed from
the world. They said: 'when Yanai got sick he captured 70 Sages of the elders
of Israel, put them in prison, and commanded the officers of the prison: If I die,
kill the Elders. So that to the extent that Israel is joyful (at my death) may
they lament their teachers.' They said: 'He (Yannai) had a good wife, Salome
by name. When he died she removed the ring from his hand and sent it to
the officer of the prison. She said to him, your master in (by) a dream has
freed these sages. He freed them and they went home. Afterward she said,
Yannai, the King is dead. And on that day that he died they make a holiday.'"
Josephus tells almost exactly the same story concerning the death of Herod. JOSEPHUS,
The Jewish War, Book I, 660 et seq. In JOSEPHUS, it is Herod's sister, Salome, who saves
the Jewish leaders. (This is not the Salmone of The New Testament.)
30. The story is told in very readable form in C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE:
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 291-306 (1959). Coke's report of Prohibitions del
Roy is at 12 COKE 63. This twelfth volume of Coke's Reports was not published during Coke's
lifetime. See Usher, James I and Sir Edward Coke, 18 ENGLISH HISTORICAL REV. 668-75
(1903).
31. Nicholas Fuller's Case, 12 COKE 41; See also BOWEN, supra note 29, at 293-301.
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of the process before the Court of High Commission as "popish, under
jurisdiction not of Christ but of anti-Christ." This inspired advocacy led
contemporaries to remark that Nicholas Fuller had "pleaded so boldly
for the enlargement of his clients that he procured his own
confinement."'
The question of whether the common law courts could issue writs
of prohibition to deny to High Commission the power to punish a bar-
rister for contempt was the context in which the greatest of the com-
mon law texts of jurisdiction was written. Fuller was finally committed
to prison though not for contempt but for, inter alia, schism and heresy
over which it was conceded that the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdic-
tion. Nonetheless, the case had precipitated a showdown on the issue
of who was to be the final arbiter of jurisdiction within the English legal
system. Archbishop Bancroft argued that the final determination of the
respective jurisdictions of courts could and should properly rest with the
King, himself, since all judges derived authority from him.3 Coke, if we
are to believe his own account of the affair, answered not only the Arch-
bishop, but the King, himself, with the ringing words that:
true it was that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent
science and great endowments of nature. But his Majesty was
not learned in the Laws of his Realm of England;... With which
the King was greatly offended, and said that then he should be
under the Law, which was treason to affirm (as he said). To which
I said, that Bracton saith, Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine,
sed sub Deo et Lege-that the King should not be under man,
but under God and the Law."
It is striking that in this case, as in the case of Simeon b. Shetah,
there is an alternative to the canonical version of the event. Contem-
porary historians have largely rejected Coke's self-serving account, 35 rely-
ing instead on other seventeenth century evidence including a letter from
Sir Roger Boswell to Dr. Milborne which recites that:
his Majestie fell into that hight indignation as the like was never
knowne in him, looking and speaking fiercely with a bended fist,
offering to strike him etc., which the Lo. Cooke perceaving fell
flatt on all fower; humbly beseeching his Majestie to take com-
passion on him and to pardon him if he thought zeale had gone
beyond his dutie and allegiance.w
In both of our stories of judges and Kings we find an unambiguous
canonical text in which the courageous judge challenges the King, af-
32. BOWEN, supra note 29, at 299.
33. Prohibitions del Roy, 12 COKE at 63; BOWEN, supra note 29, at 303-04.
34. Prohibitions del Roy, 12 COKE at 65.
35. BOWEN, supra note 29, at 305-06.
36. Id. See also Usher, supra note 29, at 673.
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firms the value of an impersonal law or source of law over the King
and places the authority of the Court to speak the law-its jurisdiction-
upon that impersonal foundation. The didactic power of these stories
inheres in part in the literary form-the compression of the messages
into a concentrated text which, itself, depicts a highly focused and ar-
tificially circumscribed stage upon which the action unfolds. In short,
the classic "unities" are observed. History is rarely so neat. The pro-
cesses by which Courts acquire the concepts of independence of jurisdic-
tion and relate it to the autonomy of the law are long and complex.
Moreover, the acts by which judges resist political subordination of
themselves, their courts, and their law almost always entail prudential
as well as principled behavior. Samaias, in Josephus' account, may have
simply seen more clearly than did his colleagues, that Herod was'a man
to be unambiguously crushed or else catered to. If Josephus is to be
credited, Samaias may have been principled in opposing Herod but he
later became Herod's political ally. 7 Similarly, according to Usher and
Holdsworth following him," Coke cowtowed to King James but lived to
continue his struggle on technical grounds in Common Pleas. Moreover,
he completed his texts which became the canon after his death.
These texts and countertexts provide an interesting context for ask-
ing what the respective places of myth and history are in the building
of law. It is important to note that from an "inside" perspective it is
Coke's report not Boswell's letter that is the "source of law", the "privil-
iged" text, the citation for the future. From the "inside" perspective
of Jewish law it is the Talmud not Josephus that is the privileged text.
History certainly should provide cold water to throw upon any
overzealous inclination to read these canonical texts uncritically. But the
complex and circuitous paths of history ought not be permitted to obscure
the proper destination of our journey. It is the canonical myths that
supply purpose for history. They are the stories we would write and
would live if we could. If we could we would, as judges, be the Lord
Coke of the Reports, the Simeon b. Shetah of tractate Sanhedrin. The
legitimating objective of jurisdiction, these canonical texts proclaim, is
prophetic not bureaucratic. As a judge, one must be other than the King
not because of the need for specialists in dispute resolution, but because
of the need to institutionalize the office of the Prophet who would say
to the King, as Nathan said to David, "You are that Man";M As Simeon
b. Shetah said to Yannai, "Stand! before He who spoke and the World
37. JOSEPHUS, supra note 22, at 176: "[Herod] held him in the greatest honour, both
because of his uprightness and because when the city was later besieged by Herod and
Sossius, he advised the people to admit Herod .. "
38. See Usher, supra note 29. See also HOLDSWORTH, 5 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
430-31 (1903).
39. II SAMUEL, ch. 12, v. 7.
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was created"; As, Coke said to James I, ". . . under no man, but under
God and the Law." For that ultimate purpose -speaking truth to power-
there must be a jurisdiction of the judge which the King cannot share.
At the moment the judge so speaks- if he so speaks-he is naked.
Much, perhaps in one sense, all, of the complexity of jurisdictional lore
from ancient times to our own day arises from a contra-motif produc-
ed in the tales through the awefulness of that very realization when
it comes to both Judge and King. If the judge does not call the King
to account-if the King is not judged-then the judge will not stand
there, as Nathan, as Simeon, as Edward Coke, stripped of institutional
protection against the power that ordinarily stands behind the Court.
Prudential deference, thus, is the great temptation, and the final sin
of judging.
In both the historical context for Prohibitions del Roy and in the
case of King Yannai/Herod, the gesture of courage is conjoined with
pragmatic concession. It may be that had the craven colleagues of Si-
meon been more courageous, they would all have survived. It may also
be that they all would have died and Simeon with them as their leader.
It may be that Lord Coke would have produced a greater gesture if
we were left in no doubt as to his standing tall before the King. It may
be that if, in fact, he kissed the royal feet, that gesture rescued both
the author of his great texts and the texts themselves from destruction.
We can never be sanguine about the capacity of courage to rescue itself.
Still, the gesture of courage is the aspiration, perhaps fabricated by Coke,
certainly rescued in the talmudic account by a deus ex machina-the
Angel Gabriel, himself. Nonetheless, were the gesture and aspiration
of resistance not the principal motif of these stories, we would have no
reason to remember them or to make them our own. We would need no
myth to prepare us to cave in before violence and defer to the power-
ful. We must get the relative roles of myth and history straight. Myth
is the part of reality we create and choose to remember in order to
reenact. It is intensely personal and committed. History is a counter-
move bringing us back to reality, requiring that we test the aspiration
objectively and prudentially. History corrects for the scale of heroics
that we would otherwise project upon the past. Only myth tells us who
we would become; only history can tell us how hard it will really be
to become that.
III. BRINGING THE MESSIAH
I have spoken until now of the fearful act of speaking law to power
and of the necessarily difficult tightrope act that judges must perform
precisely in these most challenging of cases.
Imagine yourself a tribunal. Pretend you have an audience-a com-
munity of some sort that will recognize you as a tribunal. Now, go all
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the way. What grandeur of transformation of the normative universe
would you perform? Will you simply issue a general writ of peace? A
warrant for justice notwithstanding facts and law? Will you order
everyone to be good? Perhaps, perhaps you will judge the dead? Or even
bring God as a defendant? The possibilities are endless and the qeus-
tion arises whether or why one should or should not try something
outlandish, impossible, or just plain daring. (Now, I am not speaking of
jokes. If you are to try God you must believe in God.) If law, however,
is a bridge from reality to a new world there must be some contraints
on its engineering. Judges must dare, but what happens when they lose
that reality?
I want to explore a couple of outlandish attempts to do more with
a court then perhaps we would think might plausibly be done. Among
the folktales of justice are a few serious comedies as well as the tragedies
we always rehearse. The first of these tales is a serious enough attempt
to create a Court to bring the Messiah in 1538 in the Holy Land. The
second is more recent history: the Bertrand Russell/Jean Paul Sartre
Vietnam war crimes tribunal in Sweden and Copenhagen in 1967. Both
of these events had much about them that cannot be captured in the
idea of courts and jurisdiction. But they each had something as well
which approaches an idea of jurisdiction based on "pure" legal meaning
divorced from power and coercion in every way. As such they are worth
studying.
A. The Renewal of Semikhah at Safed, 1538
Jewish law has traditionally distinguished between the authority ex-
ercised by ordinary judges and that exercised by truly ordained judges.
Ordination, or semikhah, the laying on of hands, was a transference of
authority that supposedly traced back through an uninterrupted chain
to Moses, himself. Only a truly ordained judge could decide certain
classes of cases, especially those involving fines or criminal penalties.
Sometime, probably in the fifth century, the chain of ordination was
broken.' Indeed, Roman authorities had tried to prohibit semikhah much
earlier, though according to the Jewish sources they never totally wiped
it out. 1 The end of the chain of semikah, shrouded in mystery, did not
bring a sudden or catastrophic change in the actual practices of Jewish
courts. For one thing, most elements of criminal jurisdiction had been
taken from these courts by the Roman authorities centuries before the
end of semikhah. Moreover, to the extent that Non-Jewish authorities
permitted a measure of criminal jurisdiction to the Jewish courts, Jewish
law evolved doctrinal ways of permitting that power to be exercised
40. ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, sub nom. Semikhah.
41. B. SANHEDRIN, 13b-14a.
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by judges who did not have true semikhah. Categories of penalties im-
posed by virtue of the exigency of the hour were exempted from the
semikhah requirement. In short, as one might suppose would happen,
legal fictions and categories were created to accommodate the formal
requirements of the system to reality.'
The formal characteristics of the system continued, however, to have
some impact. Certain penalties, - those biblically mandated-were not
carried out by unordained judges. Moreover, the cosmological significance
of human jurisdiction was impaired. For example, according to the
Talmud, many transgressions are punishable by "excision."' This penalty
is signaled by the biblical phrase, "And he shall be cut off. . ." Rabbinic
law had taught that this penalty meant that the person who transgressed
would either die an untimely death or, alternatively, that he would not
have a place with Israel in the world to come after the Messiah." But
the penalty or excision could be avoided by the experience of the very
this-worldly punishment of flogging for the violation in question.'5 But
precisely in this respect the fictions surrounding the exercise of rab-
binic authority cut deeply. For the floggings imposed by the bible were
among the true biblical penalties that unordained judges could not im-
pose. On the other hand, they could impose flogging for rebellion against
rabbinic authority. But were floggings imposed for rebellion efficacious
in preventing the penalty of excision? Of such stuff are academic legal
discussions made. And you can be sure that such academic discussions
there were in the thousands. But even academic discussions may become
pressing matters if conditions are ripe.
In 1492 the Jews were exiled from Spain, the home of the most im-
portant and brilliant of Jewish communities in the world. The disaster
of that exile existed at several levels. Homelessness and economic losses
were catastrophic. Cultural loss was equally great as the dominant scholars
and artists of the Jewish world lost their communities and tried to start
afresh as refugees and wanderers. If communities in Turkey and the
East profited greatly from the dislocation, it was at a great cost to those
who were themselves dislocated. Among the refugees were many who
had undergone at lest nominal conversion to Christianity during the
disasterous years attending the exile. Those pseudo-Christians or Mar-
ranoes frequently viewed themselves as having committed a grievous
42. For an interesting compiliation of these fictions and subterfuges see E. QUINT
& N. HECHT, I JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE, IT'S SOURCES AND MODERN APPLICATIONS, 139-213
(1980). The terms fictions and subterfuges" is mine and would not, I think be an accept-
able characterization of "exigency jurisdiction" to Quint and Hecht themselves. For a
much more aggressive posture on the application of exigency jurisdiction, see J. GINZ-
BERG, MISHPATIM LE' ISRAEL: A STUDY IN JEWISH CRIMINAL LAW (Hebrew) (1956).
43. See MISHNEH K'RITOTH 1, 1.
44. MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, LAWS OF REPENTANCE, ch. 8, 1 1.
45. B. MAKKOTH, 23a-b.
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sin - one punishable by excision - in the acts attending their conversion.
Their attempt to find solace, or more precisely penitence, was an im-
portant phenomenon, particularly among the most religiously active and
pious of the refugees. A second phenomenon of importance was the wave
of Messianic anticipation that attended the disasters in the wake of the
Exile. '
Both of the phenomena mentioned above raised the problem of the
true status of Jewish courts and judges. The penitents needed, or so
some of them thought, a tribunal that could impose upon them the true
biblical lashings that would absolve them from the penalty of excision,
especially now that there were signs of the coming of the Messiah. The
coming of the Messiah, itself, was related to the renewal of Semikhah.
For, in Isaiah, Chapter 1, we have a Messianic proof text: "I will return
your Judges as of Old, your counselors as at the beginning; And (then)
you shall be called the faithful city. . . ."" All rabbinic authorities agreed
that the return of the judges referred to true judges: namely those or-
dained in the tradition that went back to Moses. The text from Isaiah
thus provided an occasion for the use of law to express powerfully needs
and aspirations that are not themselves necessarily legal.'8
The precise legal question that was raised was whether it was
possible to reconstitute semikhah - true ordination-once it had been lost,
as all agreed it had been, long before the sixteenth century. For the
position that such a bold act of jurisdiction creation was possible there
was the word of the greatest of medieval Jewish authorities, Maimonides,
himself. There were two texts in the Maimonidean corpus in which the
issue was addressed as a legal question. In Maimonides' Commentary
on the Mishnah, written while Maimonides was a young man and com-
pleted in 1168, the Great Eagle wrote that if all the sages of the Land
of Israel should agree to reinstitute semikhah and should all agree on
one of their number to be the head of the academy, then that person
would be truly ordained and would have the power to pass on the or-
dination to others.'9
46. In particular, there was a major Messianic anticipation surrounding the life
and martyrdom of Solomon Molcho (1500-1532). Molcho, himself, was a reconverted Mar-
rano. He had predicted that a Messianic event would occur in 1540, and many of his
followers believed he had been miraculously saved from the stake in 1532. For the Mes-
sianic background to the Safed events, see, e.g., R. WERBLOWSKY, JOSEPH KARO, LAWYER
AND MYSTIC, 97-99 (1976); Y. MAIMON HIDUSH HA SANHEDRIN BE MEDINNATENU HA
MEHUDESHETH (1967). See also ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDACIA, sub nom. Molcho, Solomon.
47. ISAIAH, ch. 1, v. 26.
48. For examples of law as a medium of expression, see Cover, supra note 11, at 8.
49. MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH COMMENTARY, SANHEDRIN, I, 3: "And I reason that if there
be agreement from all the students and sages to appoint a man of the Academy-that
is that they make him Head-on condition that this be in Israel-then behold that would
make that person ordained and he could ordain whomever he wished."
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In his great code, the Mishneh Torah, written in 1180, Maimonides
takes a somewhat more equivocal position:
It seems to me that if all the sages in the land of Israel agree
to appoint judges and to ordain them then they would thereby
be ordained and could judge matters of fines and could ordain
others. . . . And the matter requires reflection.'
These texts suggested a blueprint for the reinstitution of ordina-
tion, even if it was not clear what the reflection on the matter would
yield. Maimonides, himself, reasoned that there had to be a formal, legal
process for reinstitution of semikhah, in part because he was not
prepared to take an apocalyptic perspective on Messianism. Indeed,
Maimonides held that the Messiah himself could do nothing against the
law. He would have no power to change or transform the law, but only
to oversee its more perfect implementation. Thus, it was necessary that
the verse "I will renew your judges . . ." be amenable to realization
without postulating any extra-legal act by the Messiah or by God.51
Maimonides' texts and the texts surrounding the renewal of
Semikhah in Safed leave little doubt that for this legal civilization "true
jurisdiction" was a sacred aspiration, a part of Messianic fulfillment. The
justice that was rendered as part of their daily lives-and these Rabbis
were all judges in their communities-was an inadequate and pallid
reflection of the justice that could be rendered by true courts. The ac-
tive approach to Messianism taken by many in the generation after 1492
included the view that those acts which were necessary preconditions
to the Messiah which could be done by human beings should be done
by them to hurry the Messiah on his way. Among those acts was the
renewal of Semikhah-the return of the Judges.2
By the 1530's there was a geographic center to the Messianic yearn-
ings, to the Kabbalistic approaches to manipulation of the cosmos and
to the legal scholarship that in Judaism had never been divorced from
the esoteric approaches to religion. That center was Safed, a small city
in the Galilee. There probably had been speculation and preparation for
a renewal of Semikhah in Safed for a year or two prior to 1538.1 Jacob
50. MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, LAWS OF SANHEDRIN, ch. 4, 11.
51. MAIMONIDES, supra note 49. Maimonides' reasoning in this respect led later com-
mentators to engage in elaborate textual exegesis to determine whether there were proof
texts for a scenario in which Maimonides' requirement for a return of judges without
abrogating the law could be satisfied without also postulating some concrete legal act
for reinstituting semikhah. See, e.g., the commentary of Yom Toy Heller on Mishneh
Sanhedrin I, 3 (Tosephoth Yor Toy) suggesting that Elijah the Prophet who undoubtedly
has Semikhah will precede the Messiah and will ordain the judges.
52. On the connection between Messianism and the renewal of Semikhah see R.
WERBLOWSKI, supra note 44, at 122-25.
53. On Berab's role in creating the academy and its spirit, see Dimitrovsky, Rabbi
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Berab, the dominant scholar in the town, seems to have attempted to
create an academy of colleagues that enacted his vision of what the Great
Sanhedrin had been and would be. Berab was able to mold a community
out of such great and often conflicting figures as Joseph Karo and Moses
b. Isaac Trani (The MaBIT)." While we do not know a lot about the
communal processes that led up to the fateful renewal of Semikah, we
can guess that there must have been an intense interpersonal atmosphere
of moral energy and collegial pride to produce such an act. For, the act
was an act of supreme juridicial chutzpah (nerve). Rabbi Jacob Berab,
the head of the Academy in Safed," the acknowledged leader if not the
acknowledged master among them, was made the head of the academy
as outlined by Maimonides and was given Semikhah. The sages of Safed
were unanimous in their appointment of Berab and in their intent to
renew Semikhah. They proclaimed their act through a message sent to
the sages of Jerusalem through one of their number.' In the message
sent to Jerusalem they also purported to confer upon the leader of the
sages of Jerusalem, Rabbi Levi Ibn Habib, ordination by virtue of the
new authority of Berab.57
The missive to Jerusalem was, of course, necessary from two perspec-
tives. First, Maimonides had written of the necessity for the consent
of all the sages in Israel. Outside of Safed, which Was by the 1530's
the dominant community in Israel, Jerusalem was the only town in the
holy land which had a community of scholars worth noting. At the very
least, the consent of Ibn Habib and of his colleagues appeared necessary
to follow the outline that Maimonides had left. Quite apart from the
legal validity of the acts in question without the assent of the Jerusalem
sages, was the political force of the failure to secure their approval. It
was hardly likely that the rest of Judaism would take the Safed experi-
ment seriously without such assent.
In fact, Ibn Habib considered the missive from Safed and quickly
concluded that it had no basis in law according to the normal canons
Ya'akou Berab's Academy, 7 SEFUNOT, ANNUAL FOR RESEARCH ON THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES
IN THE EAST, 41-102 (1983). See also R. WERBLOWSKI, supra note 44, at 125.
54. On the later conflicts between Karo and Trani see Dimitrovsky A Dispute Be-
tween Rabbi J. Caro and Rabbi Moshe Trani, 6 SEFUNOT 71-134. (1962).
55. See Dimitrovsky, supra note 50.
56. The messenger was R. Solomon Hazzan or possibly Hasson.
57. The proclamation of Semikhah and the polemical literature between R. Levi
Ibn Habib and R. Jacob Berab were collected by Ibn Habib and published by him as
a sort of appendix to his responsa. It has become known as Kunteres Ha Semikhah and
may be most conveniently found as a separately numbered addendum to She'eloth
U'Teshuvoth HaRaLBaJI reprinted, Jerusalem, 1975. Two additional items in the controversy
have been found and published by H. Dimitrovsky. 10 SEFUNOT, 113-192 (1966). These
documents are also included in the modern reprint edition. Some of the documents are
also reprinted in Y. MAIMON, supra note 46.
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of standard legal reasoning. A war of pamphlets ensued between Berab
and Ibn Habib with some assistance from others on both sides. Even-
tually, a request for a formal opinion was also sent to Rabbi David Ibn
Abi Zimra (RaDBaZ), one of the great authorities of the time, then
residing in Egypt. He sided with the sages of Jerusalem and, by his
own account, sent them a responsum denying the power to renew
semikhah.
We can hardly ignore the fact that for the Rabbis of Safed this was
not a case of standard legal reasoning. Indeed, the most eloquent
testimony to this fact is a "dog that didn't bark." Rabbi Joseph Karo
was, as I have said, among the academy that conferred semikhah on
Berab. Moreover, he, himself, was one of four disciples of Berab who
received semikhah from him when he had to leave the country a year
later. Finally, we know that Karo used the authority of Semikhah he
had received to ordain still a third "generation" of sages, his disciple
Moses Alshekh. 59 None of this would be surprising in itself. However,
in all of Karo's large legal corpus there is very little that indicates his
opinion on the validity of this audacious act. Indeed, Karo wrote a com-
mentary to the Mishneh Torah of Maimonides in which there is a gloss
to practically every legal provision in the sections covered by the com-
mentary. The provision in which Maimonides makes his creative and by
no means uncontroversial suggestion draws no substantive comment or
expression of approval from Karo. It is almost as if Karo managed to
keep his legalistic oeuvre mentally separated from this act, the reasons
for which were not standard legal reasoning but the necessity to hasten
the Messiah.10
There is in the Act of Safed, a daring commitment and a risk of
madness. The daring commitment is in this: One of law's usual func-
tions is to hold off the Messiah. Messianism implies upheaval and fairly
total transformation. Law ordinarily requires a cautious discernment
among commitments: some of these we are prepared to undertake now
58. See gloss of the RaDBaZ, in MAIMONIDES, supra note 47 C.4, 11 (printed ad
loc. in standard editions).
59. On Karo, see R. WERBLOWSKI, supra note 44, at 122-29. On Alshekh, see PORGES,
INTRODUCTION TO SHE 'ELOTH UTESHUBOTH MAHARAM ALSHEKH (1982).
60. R. WERBLOWSKY, supra note 44, at 124. There are several references, sometimes
oblique, to the Semikhah incident in the strange work, Maggid Mesharim, a sort of mystical
diary attributed to Karo in which the Mishneh personified speaks to and through Karo.
The authenticity of the attribution was long in doubt though Werblowski has established
the work as Karo's to the satisfaction of those competent to judge (of whom I am not
one). Id. ch. 2-3. One must note that the Kesef Mishneh was the last of Karo's major
works to be completed and he must have looked back at the Semikhah incident from
a perspective of it having failed. On the other hand, the MaBiT in his commentary on
the Mishneh Torah does explicitly relate the incident. Kiryath Sefer ad loc.
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with total subordination of other values; some of these we are prepared
to undertake only after specified preconditions shall be met; and some
we are not prepared to undertake now but subject to certain prior claims;
some we are prepared to undertake only after specified preconditions
shall be met; and some we are not prepared to commit ourselves to con-
cretely though we may yet acclaim their value. The readiness to move
into a pre-Messianic mode of judicature is a readiness to dramatically
increase the range of current legal commitment. It is to evince not only
dramatic dissatisfaction with the world as it is, but a looming respon-
sibility for drastic change. Now the natural understanding for a Court
confronting a gap between what is affirmed as right and the world as
perceived, is that the world will be changed. Courts exercise power to
that end. But we know from the study of failed Messiahs that the failure
of inflated expectations may entail complex compensations in the percep-
tion and understanding of a reality that cannot be brought to coincide
with the demand made upon it. The risk, in short, is that the gulf be-
tween the redeemed world and the unredeemed will be bridged not by
our committed practical behavior, but by our "inner life"-our spiritual
and psychological realities. The Safed which was to have been the home
of the Great Court or Sanhedrin became the home of Lurianic Kabbalah,
increasingly spiritual and esoteric; psychologically demanding; and power-
fully expressive of the chasm between the unredeemed fractured world
of mortal human kind and the hope and vision that could no longer be
grasped through law. Such powerful, expressive movements of the in-
ner life may have revolutionary potential, realized in this case in the
Sabbatian Movement in the 1660's. But such movements, though they
bring a Messiah, do not do so through law. Sabbatai Sevi was hardly
the Messiah Maimonides, Berab, or Karo had projected for the world.61
b. Nuremberg and The Creation of A Modern Myth
As the allied victors in World War II set out to punish many of
the leaders and other perpetrators of atrocities among the vanquished
axis powers, a curious debate took shape about the character that should
be given to the punishment proceedings. Almost nobody seriously main-
tained that the principal perpetrators of the axis war policies should
go unpunished.'2 But there was vigorous debate about whether the forms
61. See, e.g., N. COHN, THE PURSUIT OF THE MILLENIUM (1961); L. FESTINGER, et al.
WHEN PROPHECY FAILS (1956); See, more pointedly, the complex social responses to the col-
lapse of the Sabbatian Messianic Expectations. G. SCHOLEM, SABBATAI SEVI: THE MYSTICAL
MESSIAH (Werblowsky, trans) (1973) especially at 689-93. See also G. SCHOLEM, The Crypto-
Jewish Sect of Donmeh (Sabbatians) in Turkey, in THE MESSIANIC IDEA IN JUDAISM AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON JEWISH SPIRITUALITY (1972).
62. See M. BELGION, VICTORS' JUSTICE (1949) for one view that no punishment was
warranted for the "political" crimes.
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of law and justice should be used.' Charles Wyzanski asked of the trials:
For those who were not chargeable with ordinary crimes but
only with political crimes such as planning an aggressive war,
would it not have better to proceed by an executive
determination -that is, a prescription directed at certain named
individuals? . . .
To be sure, [such an executive determination] is also an exhibi-
tion of power and not of restraint. But its very merit is its naked
and unassumed character. It confesses itself to be not legal justice
but political."
Wyzanski's public challenge to the War Crimes Tribunal took place
in April, 1946. We now know that a similar debate about whether to
proceed in a juridical or purely political mode took place at the planning
stages both within the American Administration and among the allies.'5
The defense of the Nuremberg Trials-a defense which Wyzanski,
himself, came to accept in large part-was sounded at the outset in terms
of the capacity of the event to project a new legal meaning into the
future. Building a precedent which would be taken seriously was one
of Robert Jackson's enuciated objectives.' And his retrospective judg-
ment on the event included that objective as one of its principal
achievements. 7 The fact of having shed blood in the juridical mode made
the precedent one of special character. Wyzanski, by the end of 1946
acknowledged:
But the outstanding accomplishment,.of the trial, which could
never have been achieved by any more summary executive ac-
tion, is that it has crystallized the concept that there already
63. See, e.g., TUSA & TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL, ch. 1-5 (1983).
64. Wyzanski, Nuremberg-A Fair Trial? Dangerous Precedent, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
April 1946 reprinted in C. WYzANsIU, JR., THE NEW MEANING OF JUSTICE 125, 125 ( ).
65. See R. SMITH, REACHING JUDGEMENT AT NUREMBERG (1977) for debate among allies
and something of the debate within the American administration. The internal debate
is more comprehensively canvassed in B. SMITH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG. (1981) TuSA &
TUSA, supra note 60, give a summary of this material.
66. For the significance of the "aggressive war precedent" to Jackson before
Nuremberg, see, e.g., Minutes of Conference Session of July 25, 1945 in U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, 376, 383-84. (1945), Doc. 1.
67. Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, October 7, 1946 in Id. at 437:
"We have also incorporated its principles into a judicial precedent. 'The power
of the precedent,' Mr. Justice Cardozo said, 'is the power of the beaten path,'
One of the Chief obstacles to this trial was the lack of a beaten path. A judge-
ment such as has been rendered shifts the power of the precedent to the sup-
port of these rules of law. No one can hereafter deny or fail to know. that the
principles on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives constitute
law-and law with a sanction."
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is inherent in the international community a machinery both of
the expression of international criminal law and for its
enforcement."'
It is important to note that while the unlawful and evil character
of the Nazi War seemed self-evident to most, the "agressive war" crime
was also applied across the world in the trial, conviction and execution
of Japanese defendants. In retrospect, the Tokyo tribunal judgments
seem to have applied criminal sanctions to a range of conduct which
was not discontinuous with "normal statecraft" in the way that Nazi
policy had been. 9 Finally, in a series of trials by Military Commission,
American tribunals undertook to punish Japanese General Officers for
atrocities committed under their command on a theory of command
responsibility which was breathtakingly broad and, as applied, seemed
to some almost impossibly demanding. 0
The War Crimes tribunals of 1946 and the Military Commissions that
interpreted command responsibility in 1945 employed the forms of
jurisdiction in the interests of power. They were, in our typology, in-
stances of Kings using judges. That, indeed, was the essence of the
critic's case. But these were also instances of judges using Kings. It
is true that the particular proceedings at Nuremberg and Tokyo were
limited to trials of axis defendants. But, the precedent that Jackson
believed he was creating and that Wyzanski came to accept as a justifica-
tion for the Trial was one which could not be so circumscribed.
As a matter of doctrine, the judgments at Nuremberg and Tokyo
and the Yamashita enunciation of command responsibility did become
part of the law of war of the United States of America.71 However, the
controversy about the trials in 1946 had not been so much a contro-
versy over doctrine as one over jurisdiction and its exercise. The issue
was not so much whether to make "law" as it was whether to make
a Court. In making the Court in 1946 the interests of judges and of
Kings converged. What would happen when they came to diverge?
The Vietnam War, twenty years after Nuremberg, created a pro-
tracted and complex case study of the life of legal ideas when they come
to diverge from the exercise of power through state institutions. Millions
of Americans took the Nuremberg principles as their guide for conduct
in opposing the Vietnam conflict and in legitimating their large scale
opposition to a national war. Those principles were particularly well-
68. C. WYZANSKI, JR., Nuremberg in Retrospect in THE NEW MEANING OF JUSTICE, 137,
144 (1966).
69. R. MINEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971).
70. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); R. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT, WAR
CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (1982).
71. T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 50-51, 77,94 (1970).
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suited for legitimating opposition without recourse to alternative loyalties
(the old treason rubric) and without requiring any ideology of interna-
tionalism (such as WW I pacifist socialism). Moreover, once certain fac-
tual premises were accepted, the Nuremberg principles provided the
basis for an obligation to oppose such a war.
There were a variety of texts for this application of principle. Richard
Falk and Telford Taylor wrote major works legitimating the comparison
of Nuremburg to Vietnam. 2 Taylor's small book was particularly impor-
tant because of the weight of his own person-a chief prosecutor at the
second round trials at Nuremburg itself.
With a few lonely exceptions that I shall not go into detail about
here7 the official courts of the United States, when confronted with a
variety of challenges to the Vietnam War in terms of the Nuremberg
principles, refused to challenge power with law. The courts played a
deference game, averting their eyes from the wielders of violence like
the sage colleagues of Simeon b. Shetah.7' Can we expect more from
the protected holders of life tenure? Is one of the preconditions for be-
ing given such a job the expectation that one will not take advantage
of it to seriously discomfort the wielders of power?
The gesture of speaking truth to power was not often made within
the official court system; but, it was inevitable that someone would think
of institutionalizing the extraordinary popular feeling that Nuremburg
was in fact applicable through creating a "court" just as the victorious
powers had done in 1946.
In 1967 events took place first in Stockholm, then in Copenhagen
which purported to be an "International War Crimes Tribunal. 7 5 The
tribunal was under the "Honorary Presidency" of Bertrand Russell and
the "Executive Presidency" of Jean Paul Sartre.7 ' There were no in-
dividual defendants. The tribunal purported to adjudicate certain ques-
tions about the United States-Has the government of the United States
committed acts of aggression against Vietnam under the terms of inter-
72. R. FALK, THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968).
73. For an account of the exceptions and of the rule see BANNAN & BANNAN, LAW,
MORALITY AND VIETNAM (1974); A. D'AMATO & R. O'NEIL, THE JUDICIARY AND VIETNAM (1972).
Taylor, it should be noted, did feel the Nuremberg principles were directly relevant to
Vietnam and argued eloquently that we should learn that lesson, but he did not think
the domestic tribunals of theUnited States could or should stop the war. See T. TAYLOR,
supra note 68, at 120-21. The author of this article has taken the position since 1968
that whether or not they could have stopped the war, judges should have removed
themselves completely from the apparatus of complicity. See Cover, Book Review 68
COLUMB. L. REV. (1968).
74. See Cover, supra note 73; the final and most grotesque instance of this avert-
ing of the eyes took place in the Howard Levy Case. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
75. See AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL (J. Duffett ed. 1968).
76. Id. at 17.
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national law?-about the conduct of the war; and about the complicity
of other governmennts. There can be little doubt that the tribunal passed
a judgment that was in a sense a foregone conclusion. 7 There can also
be no doubt that the tribunal was understood to be a tribunal manqu6
by the very organizers themselves. They disclaimed any intent to bring
to justice or punish the perpetrators of the acts they condemned."' Yet,
the event took the form of a trial and that form was not accidental.
It did have force to others as well. The French government denied to
some participants the visas necessary to let them convene on French
territory for the trial, thus requiring it to be moved to Stockholm.
DeGaulle wrote to Sartre that:
Neither is it [the right to hold the tribunal in France] a question
of the right of assembly nor of free expression, but of duty, the
more so for France, which has taken a widely known decision
in this matter [of opposition to the war] and which must be on
guard lest a state with which it is linked and which, despite all
differences of opinion, remains its traditional friend, would on
French territory become that subject of proceedings exceeding
the limit of international law and custom. Now such would seem
to be the case with regard to the activity envisaged by Lord
Russell and his friends, since they intend to give a juridicial form
to their investigations and the semblance of a verdict to their
conclusions. I have no need to tell you that justice of any sort,
in principle as in execution, emanates from the State."9
DeGaulle thus recognized a kind of force to the tribunal as such in deny-
ing it a French location. Needless to say, Sartre did not accept the char-
acterization of the exclusive role of the State in justice which DeGaulle
asserted. But in his answer to DeGualle he went somewhat further than
nonacceptance. He also answered the question of the mandate by which
the tribunal created its own jurisdiction over the matter. In this Sartre
recognized and quite correctly delineated a relation between the tribunal
and the nonaction of the official world of law.
There was Nuremburg, of course, but after having enforced the
laws of the conqueror on the conquered-just laws, for once-
the court was quickly disbanded by its creators for fear that
one day they might find themselves brought before it ...
77. "At no time did we maintain that the Tribunal consisted of men who were
agnostic about the war in Vietnam. On the contrary, we proclaimed our conviction that
terrible crimes were occuring. ... Id. at 7. (Forward by Ralph Schoenman).
78. Opening statement of Jean Paul Sartre: "We are powerless: it is the guarantee
of our independence. . . . What is certain, in any case, is that our powerlessness . .
makes it impossible for us to pass a sentence." quoted in id. at 43.
79. Letter from DeGaulle to Sartre, April 19, 1967 cited in id.
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Why did we appoint ourselves? For the precise reason that no
one else did. Governments or peoples could have done it. But
governments want to retain the ability to commit war crimes
without running the risk of being judged; they are therefore not
about tos et up an international body responsible for judging
them. As for the people, save in time of revolution they do not
appoint tribunals; therefore they could not appoint us."
Sartre expressed some hope that the tribunal either continue or be a
precedent for similar bodies to take cognizance of other war crimes
around the world. But the important thing to note here is that the act
of utopian jurisdiction-making was, in simple terms, an anarchist variant
of a state institutional response. For Sartre it is perhaps second best.
But any response, whether by the courts of states, revoluntionary tribunals,
or the Russell tribunal would share the legal meaning created still earlier
by the primal act of Nuremburg. It is an irony of the history of this
age that Nuremburg-an act often characterized as a fig leaf for naked
power, bore as offspring the attempt to empower the fig leaf standing
alone. The "lynching party" of Robert Jackson, to use Hugo Black's
phrase becomes Lord Russell's affront to the dignity of the United States
which France would not abide-an affront that had the juridical defects
not of a lynching, but of a tea party.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Russell/Sartre tribunal, like the Sanhedrin that R. Jacob Berab
tried to set up, was a philosopher's realization of an ideal type. But both
"Courts" refrained from acts that might have tested definitively their
capacity to transform their worlds. Had the Russell/Sartre tribunal pur-
ported to license or solicit political assassination against particular defen-
dants it would certainly soon have confronted a test in blood concerning
the legitimacy of the "trial" and conviction of the defendants. For reasons
of principle as well as prudence the "Court" took only actions which
could-in a liberal democracy-be characterized by others not as a
"Court" but as dramatization, or instruction. Berab and the elders he
ordained in Safed never acknowledged any defect in their ordination.
But, they, too, so far as we know, refrained from taking specific action
that would test either world Jewry's view of the legitimacy of their
status or the Turkish overlord's authority. They used their "ordination"
but probably only for purposes for which the defective, routine ordina-
tion of ordinary Rabbis would have sufficed.
The caution which the Utopian jurist exercises in this regard is
parallel to the caution that the state's judge exercises before the King.
80. Id. at 33.
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Both thereby maintain the connection between law and reality. Both risk
losing law to the overpowering force of what is and what is dominant.
Integrity in both kinds of judges is the act of maintaining the vision
that it is only that which redeems which is law.
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